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The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict
According to one former occupant of the office, "[t]he Solicitor
General has no master to serve except his country." 1 In serving that
master, the Solicitor General has broad authority to formulate the
legal position of the United States in particular matters,2 and that
power has far-reaching effects. Through his authority to deny federal agencies and departments access to the Supreme Court, 3 the
Solicitor General may significantly influence agency and department policy. In acting as the government's advocate before the
Supreme Court, 4 in deciding whether to appeal cases unsuccessfully
litigated by the Justice Department/' and in authoring briefs for the
United States as amicus curiae in appellate cases, 0 the importance
of the Solicitor General's role is obvious.
1. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 98 (1962).
2. The Office of the Solicitor General was established by the Judiciary Act of
1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162. The current statutory provisions defining the
powers and duties of the Solicitor General are found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 505, 517,
518 (1970). The Attorney General's codification of the Solicitor General's duties
is set out in 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.20, 0.21, 0.163 (1977).
3. See Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the
Solicitor General, 78 YALE LJ. 1442, 1443 (1969). The statutory basis of this
power is somewhat unclear. The Solicitor General claims that his authority to regulate agency access to the Court is implied by the power to supervise and conduct all
governmental litigation granted to the Attorney General by 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519
(1970). See Note, supra at 1452 n.49. This authority was recognized in Port
of New York Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 498 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Solicitor General authorized to disallow appeal of Comptroller of the Currency).
Certain federal agencies have express statutory authority to proceed independent
of the Solicitor General. The ICC and the FTC, for example, are authorized to
conduct their own litigation and to file petitions for certiorari. See 15 U.S.C. §§
53, 56 (1976) (FTC); 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (ICC). The
Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2350 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), authorizes the FCC,
the Federal Maritime Commission, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Maritime Administration to petition for certiorari in a suit brought to contest an administrative order irrespective of the Solicitor General's approval. Despite this statutory
authority, the FCC and the Secretary of Agriculture regularly clear their petitions
through the Solicitor General. See Note, supra at 1451.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1970). In the 1975 Term, the Government participated, eith'er as a party or through the submission of amicus curiae briefs, in 121
of the 179 cases in which the Court heard argument. The government participated
in 175 cases decided on the merits, and the Court decided in favor of the government's position in 139 of them. [1976] ATTY. GEN, ANN. REP. 34.
5. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1977). As a practical matter, primary responsibility for the decision whether to appeal lies with the appellate sections of the Justice
Department, since the Solicitor General accepts their recommendations in 90% of
the cases. See Note, supra note 3, at 1444 n.10.
6. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c) (1977). Of course, not all disputes among agencies
arising out of government litigation reach the Solicitor General. Ordinarily, con-
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Traditionally the Supreme Court has shown great respect for the
views of the Solicitor General. Because his position carries extraordinary responsibility and identifies him as an individual of proven
legal abilities, the Solicitor General is a more formidable advocate
in ithe Court than the typical attorney, . who appears there rarely
and only on behalf of private interests. In his frequent appearances
before the Court, the Solicitor General can significantly affect the
development -of the law. And because government decisionmakers
recognize that they ultimately may either need his support or be
seriously disadvantaged in defending their position in the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General may also exercise considerable influence
on government policy.
"The United States" is hardly a sharply defined entity. The
federal government often speaks in many voices, with several of its
instrumentalities advocating inconsistent positions. Furthermore,
the position of the government, even where unambiguous, may not
reflect the public interest. Thus, in representing "the United
States," the Solicitor General may find it diliicult to identify his
"client." In order to formulate the position of the United States,
the Solicitor General may have to give priority to the views of one
among several competing government agencies, and he may have
to decide whether his obligation to the public overrides his responsibility to the government.
This Note considers the way in which the Solicitor General has
resolved-and should resolve-such ambiguities in his role as advocate for the United States. First, the Note examines the accommodation of interests represented by the Solicitor General's responses to
discordant obligations. Second, it analyzes the common law and
statutory sources of the Solicitor General's responsibilities. Finally,
the proper role of the Solicitor General is assessed, giving due
consideration to his position .as mediator among interest groups
within the government and to the institutional constraints to which
he is subject.

I.

TuE ROLES OF THE SoLICITOR GENERAL

As a first step toward an understanding of the considerations
governing how the Solicitor General should resolve conflicts in his
responsibilities, it is helpful to identify the roles manifested by
past actions of the Solicitor General. There are three identifiable,
although ~ot necessarily mutually exclusive, 7 roles played- by the
flicts among government attorneys either are resolved within the Justice Department
or, if other agencies are involved, are mediated by the Department's attorneys. Stem,
"Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV'. 759, 769 (1951).
7. In fact, it will be shown that these roles may overlap to a considerable extent.
See text following note 29 infra.
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Solicitor General: he may advocate on behalf of the "public interest," the federal government as an entity, or the Executive.
A.

The Solicitor General as Protector of the Public Interest

The Solicitor General is often -described as an advocate charged
with protecting the public's interest in the integrity of the Constitution and our legal system. 8 One way in which the Solicitor General
fulfills this role is by participating as an amicus on behalf of the
United States in cases of major constitutional import. 0 The Solicitor
General has used this position to raise issues overlooked by the
parties and to suggest an analysis that enables the Court to reach a result in the best interest of the public. 10 Thus, through the amicus
brief, the experienced Solicitor General can apply his expertise in
constitutional litigation and his familiarity with the predilections of
the Justices 11 to exercise considerable influence over the development of the law. 12
Another way in which the Solicitor General represents the public
interest is through his management of government litigation in the
Supreme Court. For example, he has joined in challenges to admin8. See, e.g., Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 Cm. B. REC. 221,
222 (1963); Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor
General's Office, 41 A.B.A.J. 229, 22!> (1955).
9. The participation by the Attorney General and the Solicitor General for the
United States as amicus curiae in constitutional litigation has an illustrious history
dating from the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. See Krislov, The Role of the
Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, in L. HUSTON, A. MILLER, S. KRISLOV & R,
DIXON, JR., THE ROLE OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 71,
80 (1968) (hereinafter cited as ROLE OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL), This amicus
practice recently has been concentrated on cases involving racial discrimination and
legislative apportionment. Id.; Note, supra note 3, at 1479.
The Supreme Court frequently invites the Solicitor General to submit an amicus
brief in constitutional litigation in which the federal government is not a party.
See Note, supra note 3, at 1480. The Supreme Court's rules governing amicus participation give special dispensations to the Solicitor General. He may submit a brief
for the United States as amicus curiae without the consent of the parties or the special leave of the Court that is required of private amici, SUP. CT. R. 42(4), and he
is also exempt from the Court's usual disfavor of requests by an amicus for permission to present oral argument without consent of the appropriate party. See
SUP. Cr. R. 44(7).
10. For example, he has suggested means of avoiding a constitutional decision
and has proposed compromise solutions likely to appeal to a majority of the Court.
See Note, supra note 3, at 1480.
11. See id.
12. See Cox, supra note 8, at 226. The importance of the Solicitor General's
reading of the Constitution is suggested by the concern of several senators who
questioned Solicitor General-designate Robert Bork on whether he would argue for
the "one man-one vote" rule, which the Solicitor General had consistently and strenuously advocated in the 1960s. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Solicitor Ge11eral, Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Bork Hearings].
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istrative agency13 rulings by calling attention either to an agency's
failure to comply with standards of administrative procedure or to
its incorrect application of a controlling statute. 14 Similarly, in the
administration of criminal litigation, the Solicitor General has gone
so far as to "confess error" by pointing out suspect practices of governmental officials in order to obtain reversals of convictions based
on flawed prosecutions. 15
Although the Solicitor General enjoys considerable autonomy in
appraising the best interests of the public when he acts as an independent advocate devoted to proper administration of the laws, an
important limitation on this role must be borne in mind. At all
times, the Solicitor General is vulnerable to peremptory dismissal by
the President, 16 and, as Justice Sutherland once observed, "[I]t is
quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure
of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will." 17 Accordingly, one might expect that the Solicitor General performs his responsibilities as an
agent of the President. In fact, however, .the Solicitor General
has established a recognized degree of autonomy. One of the critical issues raised in the ensuing discussion is the proper scope of this
independence from executive control.
B.

The Solicitor General as Attorney for the Government

The second role of the Solicitor General is that of attorney for
the federal government. The Solicitor General fulfills this role
when he acts primarily to promote government interests. For example, by selectively authorizing the government's petitions for
13. The term "agency" is used in this Note as it is defined in 28 U.S.C.
451 (1970): "The term 'agency' includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States
or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless
the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense."
14. See Note, supra note 3, at 1461-64. In Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331
(1955), the Solicitor General refused to defend the Civil Service Commission in
a suit contesting dismissal from government service on grounds of suspected disloyalty. See Lewis, Our Extraordinary Solicitor General, THE REPOR'I'.ER, May 5,
1955, at 27.
15. See Note, Confession of Error by the Solicitor General, 14 MICH, L. REV.
1067, 1069-70 (1976).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1970) provides that the Department of Justice is part
of the executive branch of the government. The Solicitor General is appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1970).
The President's power to remove the Solicitor General at his discretion follows from
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Senate has no authority to check
P.resident's constitutional power to remove any executive officer appointed by him
with advice and consent of Senate). See text at notes 163-72 infra.
17. Humphrey's Exr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). However,
some commentators have minimized the influence of the President over the Solicitor
General. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 1480-81.
§
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certiorari, the Solicitor General directs the attention of the Court
toward those cases raising issues of the broadest or most immediate
significance to the government. 18 His control over the filing of
appeals and his responsibility for shaping the government's argument on the merits also allow him to avert conflicting judicial decisions that might result if the government adopted inconsistent
positions in related cases. 19 Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General renders more effective advocacy than its governmental clients
could produce on their own, not simply because it is staffed by some
of the ablest of the government's lawyers, but also because it does
not suffer from the parochialism that typically afflicts governmental
agencies. 20
As attorney for the government, the Solicitor General is guided
not only by the concerp.s of the "political" departments of the government but also by those of the judiciary. Solicitude for the Court
is a common motif in analyses of the office by former Solicitors General. 21 Archibald Cox has referred to the "sense of loyalty to the
Court" that tempers the advocate's zealousness. 22 Rather than argue
for a sweeping decision most favorable to the immediate interests
of the government, for example, the Solicitor General may seek a
narrower ruling that more closely follows the Court's prior decisions. 28 The Solicitor General also helps ease the Court's caseload
by screening the government's petitions for certiorari. 24
18. See Note, supra note 3, at 1456-57; note 24 infra and accompanying text.
19. See Stem, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46 A.B.A.J. 154, 217 (1960). United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949),
is a striking example of the inconsistency that can take place on the part of the
government. The go_vernment, which sought reparation of overcharges by railroads
during the war, successfully contended that an ICC order denying reparations was
appealable despite the fact that in three previous cases and in a case argued simultaneously in another district, the Solicitor General or other Justice Department attorneys had defended the doctrine that such orders were not appealable. 337 U.S. at
445-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20. Miller, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in ROLE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 9, at 64-65; Stern, supra note 6, at 759-60. Cf.
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 764 n.9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
The various Governmental agencies are apt to see decisions adverse to them
from the point of view of their limited preoccupation and too often are eager
to seek review from adverse decisions which should stop with the lower courts.
The Solicitor General, however, must take a comprehensive view in determining
when certiorari should be sought.
21. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 8, at 222-23; Sobeloff, supra note 8, at 230.
22. Cox, supra note 8, at 222-23.
23. Of course, tactical considerations may also dictate the need for such judicious
advocacy.
24. See Note, supra note 3, at 1454. See also Fahy, The Office of the Solicitor
General, 28 A.B.A.J. 20, 21 (1942). The Solicitor General generally selects the
cases for which a petition is filed by applying the criteria apparently used by the
Court to determine whether to grant certiorari. See Note, supra note 3, at 1454.
See also Sobeloff, supra note 8, at 231. The perceptiveness of the Solicitor General
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The Solicitor General as Attorney for the Executive

The third and narrowest role of the Solicitor General is that of
attorney for the Executive. The Solicitor ·General has become involved in several disputes between Congress and the Executive,
usually when the former has attempted to impose constraints upon
the powers of the President. In these cases the Solicitor General
invariably advocates on behalf of the Executive. For example, he
defended executive interests in a case involving a congressman's immunity from federal grand jury questioning. 25 He has also contested
attempts by Congress to limit presidential powers to appoint and remove officers 26 and to veto legislation. 27 The Solicitor General is
not single-minded in his devotion to the Executive, 28 but his conand the Court's confidence in his judgment are suggested by the vastly greater success
of govenµnent petitions over those of private litigants. During the 1975 Term,
for example, the Court granted certiorari for 80% of the petitions filed or supported
by the government and for only 5% of all other petitions. [1976] ATTY. GEN. ANN.
REP. 31.

25. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Humphrey's Exr.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Solicitor General represented executive
interests in contesting congressional authority to appoint members of commission
exercising executive powers).
27. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); The Pocket Veto
Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1975, at 30, col. 5 (statement by Solicitor General Bork explaining the Executive's decision not to petition
for certiorari in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a pocket
veto case).
28. For example, in litigating separation of powers issues, the Solicitor General
has sometimes advocated government interests other than those of the Executive.
In United ~tates v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), plaintiff government employees
challenged the validity of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1943, ch.
218, § 304, 57 Stat. 450 (1943), which forbade payment of any compensation to
them because they had not been reappointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Solicitor General petitioned for certiorari on behalf
of the United States even though the plaintiffs, who had been supported by the
Solicitor General, had prevailed in the Court of Claims, 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl.
1945). The special counsel appointed to represent Congress had requested the Solicitor General to file the petition, but it appears that the Solicitor General independently concluded that an authoritative disposition of the issues by the Supreme
Court was "of the highest importance to the Government of the United States and
particularly to its executive and legislative branches." Respondent's Brief for Certiorari at 9. The respondents agreed with the Solicitor General on the importance
of the issue and so did not oppose the motion for certiorari. Memorandum for
the Respondents. In argument on the merits, the Solicitor General urged that the
Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 violated the constitutional prohibition
of bills of attainder and invaded the constitutional powers of the President. He
took no position, however, on the respondent's assertion that § 304 offended their
right to due process. The Supreme Court decided the case on the ground that § 304
was a bill of attainder proscribed by the Constitution. 328 U.S. at 318.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Solicitor General joined in the
brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Election Commission, which defended the validity of the campaign contribution and expenditure limitations provided
by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
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sistent advocacy of the executive position leaves little doubt that,
when executive powers are brought into question, the Solicitor Gen~
eral displaces the broad perspective associated with his office and
serves as counsel to the President. 29
It must be remembered that the roles served by the Solicitor
General are not necessarily mutually exclusive. No doubt the Solicitor General handles most of the cases that come to his office without
fretting over what role he should play. Moreover, in some cases
where a conscious choice is necessary the Solicitor General may adopt
one role while accommodating certain interests represented by another. Nevertheless, even in •these cases a choice must be made, and
this imperative raises the question of what considerations actually
govern-and should govern-the Solicitor General's decision. To
answer this question requires examination of the sources of his
authority.
(1972), as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). However, he also submitted an amicus
curiae brief for the United States in which he insisted that the provisions setting
forth the selection procedure and the powers of the Federal Election Commission
invaded the executive domain by according enforcement powers to a body not appointed in its entirety by the President. The brief also contained a discussion of
the substantive provisions of the Act. Although this portion of the brief purported
to assess the arguments of both sides fairly, the discussion did not conceal the
author's distaste for the Act. Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2.
29. On only one reported occasion has the Solicitor General defied the Executive, and even then his defiance consisted merely of a refusal to argue for the
government. Lewis, supra note 14, at 27, 30-31 (discussing refusal of Solicitor
General to appear in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), in defense of the
government's claim that it need not reveal the identity of accusers in loyalty and
security cases). For a criticism of the Solicitor General's adherence to the executive
view in one line of cases, see Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative
Due Process: A Quarter-Century of Advocacy, 36 GEO, WASH. L. REV. 481 (1968).
The commitment of the Solicitor General to the Executive has compelled Congress to take special measures to obtain representation of its interests. For example,
in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), Congress' position was represented
by a senator, who submitted a brief and presented oral argument at the request
of the Court. 272 U.S. at 176. A member of the House appeared as an amicus
by special leave of the Court to defend Congress in the Pocket Veto Case, 279
U.S. 655, 673 (1929). When plaintiffs in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946), discussed in note 28 supra, initiated their suit challenging § 304 of the
Ur,gent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, Congress made special provision for
appointment of counsel to defend the validity of the Act. H.R. Res, 386, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REC. 110882 (1943); H.R. Res. 230, 78th Cong,, 2d Sess.,
8 Stat. 113 (1944).
In a few isolated instances the Attorney General has declined to assert a suggested executive power. In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798),
the Attorney General disputed the contention that an amendment to the Constitution
is valid only if signed by the President. 3 U.S. (3 Dall,) at 381. In United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), the Court invalidated a statute
on the ground that it unconstitutionally infringes the power of the President to issue
pardons. The Attorney General and the Solicitor General had argued in support
of the law.
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FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S POWER

A.

Constitutional and Statutory Foundations

Except for the general provision that the President "shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed,"30 the Constitution is silent
on the matter of legal representation for the government. One must
look to statute for express provision for such representation.
The Office of Solicitor General was created by the Judiciary Act
of 1870.31 As then conceived, the Solicitor General was to serve
merely as the Attorney General's associate responsible for the
government's courtroom work. 32 The statutory delineation of the
Solicitor General's responsibility has remained unchanged: he exercises authority only as a delegate of the Attorney General. 33 Because
of this derivative responsibility, analysis of the Solicitor General's
function requires examination of the larger role of the Attorney
General.
·
The legislative history of the Office of Attorney General contains
no clear indication of how he should resolve intragovernmental conflicts involving the represention of the government in the courts.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the office, provided
simply that the Attorney General shall "prosecute and conduct all
suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned."34 Some have argued that this language demonstrates that
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. As head of an executive department, 28 U.S.C.
501 (1970), the Attorney General is obligated by the Constitution to submit
opinions relating to his duties upon request by the. President, U.S. CoNST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 1.
31. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162.
32. See Letter from Attorney General Stanbery to the Senate (Dec. 20, 1867)
quoted in H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 222-23 (1937); CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3065, 4490 (1870). Distressed by the large sums
of public funds expended by the Attorney General to retain private attorneys to
handle the crush of government litigation in the post-Civil War period, Congress
expected the creation of a Solicitor General to eliminate the need to resort to outside counsel. See CoNG. GLOBE, supra, at 3035, 3065.
The creation of the Solicitor General in the United States mirrored the Solicitor
General's appearance in England some four centuries before. About the time of
the reign of Edward IV (1461-1483), an attorney was appointed as a subordinate
of the King's attorney, the Attorney General, to perform "the sort of informal work
connected with litigation which fell to the lot of the private solicitors." 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462-63 (1924 ed.). See note 64 infra. In
contrast to American practice, the Office of Solicitor General in England became
a stepping stone to the Office of Attorney General. Id. at 463.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1970): ''The President shall appoint in the Department of Justice, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist the Attorney General in the performance of his
duties." The Attorney General may direct the Solicitor General to appear in a
federal or state court to attend to the interests of the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 517 (1970). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1970) (conduct of litigation in the Court
of Claims and the Supreme Court).
34. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92. The section also provided
§
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the framers of the Constitution did not envision the Attorney General as an executive officer, 35 but history has clarified what the language leaves ambiguous. Although the Attorney General at first
served as de facto counsel for Congress36 and did not officially become the head of an executive department until 1870,37 he was actually absorbed into the executive sphere much earlier. 38 As the
President's role in setting national policy grew, the distinction between the Attorney General's roles as adviser to the Executive and
as chief legal officer of the United States blurred. 39 Today, both
the integration of Justice Department policy into the larger concerns
of the Executive and the political and personal affinity between the
Attorney General and the President are taken for granted. •0
The significance of this historical development is that in the absence of any persuasive countervailing constitutional or statutory aufor the Attorney General's preparation of advisory opinions upon the request of
the President and department heads.
35. See, e.g., Note, Removing Politics from the Justice Department: Constitu•
tional Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 366, 389 (1975).
36. L. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 8 (1967),
37. Id. at 35-36.
38. Attorney General Edmund Randolph attended the first cabinet meeting, and
ever since the Attorney General has been considered a member of the Cabinet.
Id. at 9.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 stipulated that the Attorney General shall "give his
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the
United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments," Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, but did not provide for any corresponding
obligation to furnish legal opinions to Congress.
39. Attorney General Taney's support of President Jackson's campaign against
the national bank is an early manifestation of the synthesis of the Attorney General's
roles as legal counsel for and political affiliate of the President. See H. CUMMINGS
& C. McFARLAND, supra note 32, at 100-19. A few Attorneys General have resisted
political affiliation with the President. Edward Bates, Att(?rney General under President Lincoln, has been quoted as saying that "[t]he office of Attorney General
is not properly political, but strictly legal; and it is my duty, above all other ministers
of State to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever quarter,
of mere will and power." Quoted in Miller, The Attorney General as the President's
Lawyer, in ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 9, at 51 (1968) (emphasis
original).
40. See generally Miller, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in
ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 9, at 41-70; Rosenbaum, Choosing
a Friend for Attorney General, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1976, at 13, col. 4. The
relationship between the Justice Department and the President received considerable
attention during Senate hearings on various proposals to reduce presidential control
of the Department. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978]. Several persons formerly associated with the Jus•
tice Department or the Executive commented that the impact of many Department
activities on matters within the ambit of executive policy required close rapport
between the Attorney General and the President. See, e.g., id. at 18-19 (statement
of Theodore Sorensen), 1~8 (statement of Ramsey Clark), 177 (statement of J. Lee
Rankin).
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thority the Attorney General's and, hence, the Solicitor General's representation of the interests of the United States is likely to be responsive to executive command. Significantly, the one statutory provision that conceivably signified an effort by Congress to compel
the Attorney General to look to it as the arbiter of the interest of
the United States-the federaJ intervention statute-has not in practice displaced the preferred status of the Executive. This statute
empowers the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the United
States in any proceeding in federal court in which the constitutionality of an act of Congress is questioned. 41 Since its purpose is "to
insure adequate defense of federal legislation,"42 this act could be
construed as imposing a duty upon the Justice Department to defend
legislation exposed to constitutional attack. 43 There are two reasons
to reject this interpretation, however. First, Congress did not compel
the Attorney General to intervene. 44 Second, it is not clear that the
statute requires the Attorney General to defend the statute in all
cases in which he does intervene. Although several courts have
suggested in dicta that the Attorney General can intervene pursuant
to the act only .as a proponent of the statute in question, 45 the issue
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970), as amended by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-381, § 5, 90 Stat. 1120. Section 2403 reads in part:
In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which
the United States or any agency, officer' or employee thereof is not a party,
wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest
is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General,
and shall permit the United States to intervene for ·presentation of evidence,
if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question
of constitutionality.
The 1976 amendment also provided the states with an analogous right to intervene.
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1120 (to be codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b)).
42. See 81 CoNG. REC. 3258-59 (1937); 38 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153 (1938).
43. Supporters of the measure in Congress asserted that "the government" has
an adversarial interest in the constitutionality of congressional enactments. Congress is entitled to provide for representation of this interest, the argument continued,
and the Attorney General is the appropriate designee of this responsibility, as he is
the chief legal officer of the government and, as an executive officer, obligated
to execute the laws. See 81 CONG. REc. 3254-55, 3268-69 (1937). ·
.
44. It has been suggested that Congress left the decision to intervene to the
discretion of the Attorney General so that he could avoid unnecessary litigation,
as where the constitutional challenge is frivolous or the statute is adequately defended by a private party to the action, and so that he could select the most appropriate test case for intervention when a statute is challenged in several proceedings
concurrently. See 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 153, 156 (1938). See also Evans v. American
Fedn. of Television & Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 826 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
revd. on other grounds, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974)
(although the Attorney General made no response to certification by the court pursuant to § 2403, the district court noted that "[t]he issues have been fully briefed.
Defendant is entirely capable of representing the public interest in the action, and
the litigation is adversary, and not collusive").
45. See Wallach v. Lieberman, 366 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1966); Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 36 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Cf. Sil CONG. REC. 3268
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has not been decided, and in one case the Attorney General did join
the attack on the constitutionality of a statute. 46 Thus, Congress
has not seen :filt to command the government's legal department to
make every effort to save legislative determinations of what is in the
best public interest.
B.

The Common-Law Foundation of the Attorney
General's Power
1.

The State Attorney General's Authority

Since neither the Constitution nor the statutes clarify the responsibility of the Solicitor General, it is helpful to consider a third
possible source of authority for his conduct: the common law, which
has been the inspiration and reference for the delineation of the
powers of most state attorneys general. 47 Examining the authority
of state attorneys general is useful for two reasons. First, state practice concretely illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of having
a public advocate with independent standing to contest governmental
acts. Second, the political stature of the state attorney general48
(remarks of Rep. Michener) (1937) (suggesting that the Attorney General could
exercise his discretion not to intervene if he is unwilling to support the statute).
46. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C.
1962), revd., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
The statutory provision challenged was § 622(f) of the Hill-Burton Act, ch. 958,
60 Stat. 1043 (1946), which allowed hospitals receiving funds under the Act to
maintain "separate but equal" facilities. Also challenged was a regulation promulgated by HEW pursuant to the Act. 21 Fed. Reg. 9841 (1956) (current version
at 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1976) ). The defendants questioned the right of the Justice
Department to intervene in support of the plaintiffs, but the trial judge granted
the Department's motion for leave to intervene without reported comment. 211
F. Supp. at 630. Writing for the circuit court, Judge Sobeloff, a former Solicitor
General, remarked simply that "throughout the proceedings the Government, unusually enough, has joined the plaintiffs in this attack on the congressional Act and
the regulation made pursuant thereto." 323 F.2d at 962. See also Krislov, Tire
Role of the Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, in Rou; OF THE ATTORNEY GEN•
ERAL, supra note 9, at 96-98.
47. See NATIONAL AssN. OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMON LAW POWERS OF
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 20-21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMON LAW
POWERS]. The definition of the attorney general's powers by reference to the common law does not necessarily preclude a statutory basis for his authority. Of the
six states in which the attorney general's office is created by statute, the attorney
general has common-law powers in four. See NATIONAL ASSN. OF ATTORNEYS GEN•
ERAL, REPORT ON TiiE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 24, 39 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT]. In two states, these common-law powers are conferred expressly
by statute. HAw. REV. STAT. § 26-7 (1968 & Supp. 1975); VT. STAT, ANN. tit.
III, § 152 (1972). In Alaska, the statute provides that the attorney general has
those duties which are required by law "or which usually pertain to the office of
attorney general in a state." ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020 (1976). In Connecticut,
the attorney general's powers, though enumerated at length in the statute, correspond
to the usual common-law powers. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-125 (West Supp.
1977).
48. As of 1971, 42 states had elected attorneys general. The attorney general
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points out differences in the scope of the authority of state and federal attorneys general to exercise independent judgment on behalf
of the public interest.
In most states, the attorney general enjoys substantial independent authority to contest governmental acts on behalf of the public,
either by virtue of electoral mandate or through a constitutional or
statutory conferral of broad powers to speak for the public. 49 In
these states, two approaches have been followed to define the attorney general's powers as public advocate. One is to grant the attorney general the express authority to institute or intercede in certain
types of cases. This approach is illustrated by Wisconsin law. The
Attorney General of Wisconsin has no inherent power to bring legal
action on behalf of the public, 50 but he does have statutory authority
to prosecute an elaborate array of actions51 and, pursuant to general
authority to represent the state, may advocate a public interest entrusted to the care of the state. 52 This general authority allows the
Wisconsin Attorney General to contest acts of a state agency. For
example, he has joined in the appeal of a decision of a state administrative agency 58 and has brought an action contesting the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 54
The second, and more prevalent, means of defining the powers
of a state attorney general is through the adoption of common-law
doctrine. Quite distinct from his obligation to the state government,
the attorney general at common law has an inherent duty to advocate
on behalf of -independent public interests. 55 There is no uniform deis selected by the governor in six states, by the legislature in one, and by the state
supreme court in one. REPORT, supra note 47, at 62-63.
49. See generally id. at 43-57.
50. In re Estate of Sharp, 63 Wis. 2d 254, 217 N.W.2d 258 (1974). In Wisconsin a distinction is drawn between the standing of the state and the standing of
the Attorney General to bring an action. The power of the state to sue does not
entitle the Attorney General to bring an action in the name of the state without
express statutory authorization. See State v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co.,
136 Wis. 179, 116 N.W. 900 (1908).
51. See Van Alstyne & Roberts, The Powers of the Attorney General in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 721, 739-47.
52. E.g., the public right to recreational enjoyment of the navigable waters of
the state. Muench v. Public Serv. Commn., 261 Wis. 492, 513-14, 53 N.W.2d
514, 523 (1952).
53. 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
54. State ex rel• .Reynolds v. Smith, 19 Wis. 2d 577, 120 N.W.2d 664 (1963)
( constitutionality of an apportionment statute). Conflicts between the governor and
the legislature over apportionment are something of a tradition in Wisconsin. See
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).
55. See State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249
P. 996 (1926) (upholding power of attorney general to oppose, on behalf of the
public, an agency or officer of the state). A suit instituted by the state attorney
general to remedy injury done to the public may be brought in the name of the
state, but still may be distinguished from a suit for injury to the institutions of
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lineation of the powers of the attorney general at common law, 50 but
the core of the doctrine is the notion that the attorney general has
the authority to "institute, conduct and maintain all such actions and
proceedings as he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws
of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public
rights." 57 In some states, this responsibility to represent the public
interest is considered. paramount to the obligation to provide counsel
to the government. 58 Attorneys general with common-law authority,
like those with statutory authority, 119 have challenged state agencies
for failing to comply with administrative standards00 and have con.tested the validity of statutes. 61
The distinction between defining the attorney general's powers
by a constellation of statutes and by the common law may be significant only in theory. The common-law powers of an attorney general
may be limited or partially withdrawn by statute, 62 and an attorney
the state government. See, e.g., Queens Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen,,
22 S.W. 1048, 1052 (Tex. Ct. App.), revd. on other grounds, 86 Tex. 250, 24
S.W. 397 (1893). But cf. St. Regis Paper Co. v. New Hampshire Water Resources
Bd., 92 N.H. •164, 170-71, 26 A.2d 832, 838 (1942) (distinction between rights
of the public and rights of the state is merely theoretical).
56. De Long, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney General in Criminal
Prosecutions, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 358, 362 (1934): "The application
from one jurisdiction to another of this seemingly simple principle [of commonlaw power] has produced an astonishing array of mutations which make it altogether
impossible to reach any sweeping generalization on the matter."
57. Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 308, 110 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1961). See
Myhre, The Attorney for the State and the Attorney for the People: The Powers
and Duties of the Attorney General of North Dakota, 52 N.D.L. REV. 349, 35357 (1975). In the words of one early court:
[T]he principles of the common law . . . make the attorney general the proper
representative of the people of the state in all courts of justice, and charge
him with the official duty of interposing for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the public whenever those rights are invaded, and there is
no other adequate or available means of redress.
Hunt v. Railway Co., 20 III. App. 282, 290 (1886), affd. sub nom. Hunt v. Chicago
Horse & Dummy Ry. Co., 121 III. 638, 13 N.E. 176 (1887).
58. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974);
State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 P. 996 ( 1926).
59. See, e.g., notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Trustees of Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 319 Mass.
642, 67 N.E.2d 676 (1946); State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization,
140 Wash. 433, 249 P. 996 (1926).
61. See, e.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360
N.E.2d 773 (1976); Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N.J. Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 366 (Prerog,
Ct. 1943), affd., 135 N.J. Eq. 244, 38 A.2d 199 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974); Hansen v. Barlow,
23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969).
62. The common-law powers of an attorney general are subject to statutory modification in all states but Illinois. See REPORT, supra note 47, at 41. The Illinois
Supreme Court has ruled that the constitutional provision that the attorney general
"shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law," ILL, CONST. of 1870,
art. V, § 1, vested him with the irreducible powers of the attorney general at common law. Consequently, the legislature can expand but cannot diminish his powers.
People v. Finnegan, 378 III. 387, 38 N.E.2d 715 (1941). This ruling was handed
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general who exercises only specifically enumerated statutory powers
may nonetheless acquire authority as comprehensive as that of his
common-law counterpart. 63 Some differences can be discerned,
however. If only because of his historical links to the English attorney general, 64 the attorney general with common-law powers is
thought to be more of an advocate for public interests in the administration of government and law than is an attorney general whose
capacity to protect public interests is conferred 'by the legislature,
for just as the attorney general in England was responsible for the
interests of the sovereign Crown in the courts, the American attorney
general with common-law authority represents the interests of the
sovereign public. 65
In some circumstances it might appear reasonable to qualify the
attorney general's statutory or common-law power to advocate on behalf of the public interest in opposition to administrative or legislative
action. 66 Two principal objections have been raised to efforts by
down under the 1870 constitution. The constitution now in force defines the duties
of the attorney general in similar terms, ILL. CONST. art. 5, § 15, and thus the
doctrine remains authoritative.
Where the attorney general is a constitutional officer, the discretion of the legislature to contract his authority is limited by the precept that the legislature cannot
render the powers of the office nugatory as an alternative to outright abolition.
See Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820
(1942).
63. E.g., Wisconsin, discussed in notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
64. See 0. HAMMONDS, THE ATIORNEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES
3 (Anglo-American Legal Hist. Series, Ser. 1, No. 2, 1939). The office of attorney
general in England evolved during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as the King
increasingly conducted his legal business through a single attorney with a broad
charter rather than through several attorneys with powers limited to a particular
court, region, or matter. By the end of the sixteenth century, the King's attorney
had become the chief representative of the Crown in the courts, 6 W. HOLDSWORTII,
supra note 32, at 458-61, and the pqwers he exercised were absorbed into the common
law. See Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney
General in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 309
(1958).
· 65. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867
(Ky. 1974). See also NATIONAL ASSN. OF ATIORNEYS GENERAL, PROCEEDINGS 61ST
ANNUAL MEETING 1967, at 102 (1968).
.
66. Many states restrict the ability of the attorney general to contest governmental acts in either of two ways. The attorney general may simply lack standing
to contest the actions of governmental entities in court. See, e.g., Arizona State
Land Dept. v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960) (under the state constitution, Arizona attorney general has only those powers conferred by statute; since
no statute authorized him to contest sale of public land by the Land Department,
he could not sue to enjoin the sale). Even where the attorney general has standing
to appear as an adversary to a state agency, he may lack independent authority
to represent the public interest when, in the discharge of his duties, he serves as
a subordinate to a branch of the government, ordinarily the governor. For example,
an Alaska statute accords the state attorney general traditional common-law powers,
ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020 (1976), including general standing to advocate on behalf
of the public. See text at note 55 supra. However, the Alaska attorney general
is appointed by the governor subject to confirmation by the state legislature, serves
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the attorney general to contest agency actions. First, the attorney
general's opposition to agency conduct may deprive the agency of
the means of securing representation that effectively advocates its
side of the controversy. This concern raises a genuine problem implicit in a system that expects a single official to represent dissimilar
interests-the "public" and the state institutions-or to represent the
government as a single entity when it is, in fact, a collective of disparate elements. In some states, only the attorney general or his
designee can represent a governmental litigant. 67 In such a state,
an agency pursuing conduct opposed by the attorney general would
lack representation in that controversy unless the attorney general
appoints special counsel. And, because of the close relationship between the attorney general and his designee, one court has determined that this system does not provide the agency with adequate
representation. 68 Fortunately, in most situations this problem can
be resolved by the enactment of statutes authorizing an agency to
retain counsel when the attorney general declines to take the
agency's position. 69
The opposition of the state attorney general to the action of a
state agency has also been criticized as offending the legislative intent that prompted creation of the agency. It has been argued that,
by granting adjudicative or administrative powers to an agency, the
legislature makes it the exclusive governmental arbiter of the public
interest on matters within the scope of its jurisdiction.70 Even if
at the pleasure of the governor, ALASKA CoNST., art. III, § 25, and, as head of
the state's legal department, is supervised by the governor, ALASKA CONST., art.
III, § 24. Thus, although no case so states, it might be inferred that the attorney
general exercises his power to advocate for the public interest entirely at the direction of the governor.
67. The exclusive right of the attorney general to represent the government is
maintained in some states as a doctrine of common law, see, e.g., Fergus v. Russel,
270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. •130 (1915), and in others by statute, e.g., ARIZ. REV, STAT.
ANN. § 41-192(E) (West 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1614 (1975); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.§ 109.02 (Page 1978).
68. City of York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Commn., 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d
825 (1972). In this case, the commission's attorney had been appointed by the
state attorney general pursuant to 66 PA. CONS. SrAT. ANN. § 460 (Purdon 1959).
The court ruled that the attorney general could not intervene in an appellate proceeding to contest a ruling by the commission because the commission's attorney
would be inclined to temper his advocacy to avoid offending his appointor. 449
Pa. at 151-52, 295 A.2d at 833. One commentator has criticized the court's reasoning, contending in part that the trial judge can protect the commission's counsel
from intimidation. Comment, The Attorney General as Consumer Advocate, 121
U. PA. L. REV, 1170, 1182 (1973).
69. Agencies have 'this statutory authority in several states. These statutes have
been upheld as permissible legislative modifications of the attorney general's powers.
See REPORT, supra note 47, at 50-51; Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note 51, at
728.
70. See State ex rel. McKittrick v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Commn., 352 Mo. 29,
175 S.W.2d 857 (1943).
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this argument is accepted, however, at least three reasons suggest
that it would not necessarily preclude the attorney general from
challenging an agency ruling. First, the administrative responsibilities of the government's legal department as established by statute
may overlap with the agency's jurisdiction. 71 In this circumstance,
the standing of the attorney general to contest the agency decision
may be said to subsist by legislative designation rather than by inference from his status as public advocate. Second, it has been argued
that to construe the rulings of a quasi-judicial agency as determinations of the public interest blurs a necessary distinction between
judge and advocate. 72 In Muench v. Public Service Commission, 13
the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that a ruling of the commission represented a weighing of the competing interests presented by
parties with a stake in the outcome. The court noted that one_ of
those interests may be a substantive public interest, and therefore
it concluded that due process would be jeopardized if the agency
were charged, in addition to its adjudicative task, with achrocating
the claims of one of the several competing interests. 74
The third reason for rejecting this legislative intent argument
recognizes the important role the attorney general can play as a
guardian of administrative integrity. Even if the attorney general's
standing to contest agency action infringes upon the agency's delegated authority to discern the public interest, that power of the attorney general may nonetheless be warranted as a check against transgressions committed by the organs of government. The attorney
general may contest the validity of a governmental action simply as
a means of compelling the agency responsible for the action to comply with required procedure75 or to apply the proper law, 76 rather
than forcing it to reconsider its policy decision. Insisting that the
agency itself represents or determines the public interest fails to appreciate that the "public interest" subsists not only in governmental
policy, but also in the adherence by the organs of government to
71. A troublesome source of overlapping administrative authority at the federal
level is the intersection of antitrust enforcement and regulation of individual industries. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964)
(Justice Department attacked merger approved by the Federal Power Commission);
United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (Justice Department
attacked merger approved by the Comptroller of the Currency).
72. See NATIONAL ASSN. OF ArroRNEYS GENERAL, ATIORNEY GENERALS' INTERVENTION BEFORE REGULATORY AGENCIES 3-4 (1975).
73. 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
74. 261 Wis. at 514, 53 N.W.2d at 523.
75. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
123 Neb. 259,242 N.W. 609 (1932).
76. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433,
249 P. 996 (1926) (attorney general sued for writ of mandamus to compel state
tax board to observe new rate schedule).
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lawful procedure and in the respect of the constitutional limitations
imposed on the exercise of governmental power. 77
The power of the attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of a statute has also been questioned. The basis for this criticism
is the theory that acts of an elected legislature are authoritative expressions of the public interest that the attorney general is obligated
to follow. 78 Nevertheless, the standing of the attorney general to
initiate or to enter suits challenging the validity of a statute has been
recognized as a common-law power79 and as a power inherent in the
attorney general's constitutional or statutory duty to enforce the
law. 8° Furthermore, the theory that the attorney general's duty to
enforce the law bars him from opposing a statute is outweighed by
his responsibility to enforce the constitution, particularly where no
private party has standing to challenge the statute. 81 As with administrative action, the attorney general's power to contest legislative action furthers a policy of subjecting governmental action to the restraining influence c;>f the attorney general's scrutiny as well as providing the widest possible scope to judicial review. 82
77. In Dunbar, the defendant board asserted that the statutory duty of the attorney general to defend all actions brought against state officials barred his suit against
the board. The court dismissed this contention, declaring that the Attorney General
is not to
sit supinely by and allow state officers to violate their duties and be recreant
to their trusts. . . . [Rather his] paramount duty is made the protection of
the interest of the people of the state, and, where he is cognizant of violations of the Constitution or the statutes by a state officer, his duty is to obstruct
and not to assist, and, where the interests of the public are antagonistic to
those of state officers, or where state officers may conflict among themselves,
it is impossible and improper for the Attorney General to defend such state
officers.
140 Wash. at 440, 249 P. at 999. The prevailing theory in the Washington courts
at the time of Dunbar appears to have been that the attorney general lacked commonlaw powers, 140 Wash. at 438, 249 P. at 998; State ex rel. Winston v. Seattle
Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 P. 946 (1902). This strong language demonstrates that the conception of the attorney general as advocate for the public is
not confined to the common-law definition of his powers.
78. See Comment, An Attorney General's Standing Before the Supreme Court
To Attack the Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 624, 627 (1959).
19. See Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 NJ. Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 366 (Prerog. Ct.
1943), affd., 135 N.J. Eq. 244, 38 A.2d 199 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
80. See Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867-68 (Ky.
1974); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969). Contra, Baxley
v. Rutland, 409 F. Supp. 1249 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
81. See Comment, supra note 78, at 631-32.
Several states have recognized a similar principle that public officials responsible
for control of public funds have standing to challenge the validity of an appropriation
statute. See Carroll v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 136 Conn. 49, 68 A.2d 299 (1949);
Green v. City of Pensacola, 108 So. 2d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Solberg
v. State Treasurer, 78 N.D. 806, 53 N.W.2d 49 (1952). This principle would justify
the Executive's position in United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427 (1896), wherein
it unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a federal statute offering bounties to
sugar producers.
82. Quite often the attorney general's suit to contest the validity of a statute
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As the foregoing discussion of state practice demonstrates, the
common-law doctrine that the state's chief legal officer has independent authority to speak on behalf of the public interest has important implications in American government. When he appears
before a public agency, he may present a viewpoint that might otherwise be unarticulated, and when he contests governmental action he
brings to bear judicial sanctions against the abuse of governmental
powers. In either event, by exercising his power the attorney general may enhance the responsiveness of government to the public
interest.
2.

The Common-Law Authority of the Attorney
General of the United States

Returning to the federal sphere, we face the threshold issue
whether common-law authority is imputed to the Attorney General
of the United States. As a preliminary observation, it is apparent
that the objections to the Attorney General's power to oppose agency
action can be overcome .in the federal setting as well as in the state
setting. 83 First, since Congress has authorized most instrumentalities
of the federal government to retain counsel, 84 the general obligations
of the Attorney General and Solicitor General to conduct -the litigation of the United States and its agencies85 should not disable either
from litigating as an adversary of an agency. Second, the assertion
that an agency decision preempts a determination of the "public
interest" by the Attorney General is inapposite where the Justice
is directed against the administrative agency of the state responsible for administering
the statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 199 N.W.2d 738, 188 Neb.
817 (1972); Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 135 NJ. Eq. 244, 38 A.2d 199 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1944). Consequently, the problem of insuring representation of the agency
may also arise. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text. In fact, the representation of the agency is a question of greater moment when it is called upon
to defend not its own judgment, but an act of the legislature. The one case found
in which a state attorney general sued the governor was actually a challenge to
a statute, since the attorney general contested not a discretionary act of the governor,
but a statute vesting the governor with certain powers to appoint counsel for state
agencies. See Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d
820 (1942).
83. See text at notes 66-77 supra.
84. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970) (NLRB); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1976) (SEC);
15 U.S.C. § 717s(c) (1976) (FPC). Prior to amendment, federal law provided that
the executive departments shall secure all needed legal services from the Justice Department. Judiciary Act of 1870, ch. 150, § 17, 16 Stat. 164 (1870) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 306 (1960) ). As part of the comprehensive rev-ision of Title 5 of the
United States Code, Act of Sept. 6, 11966, Pub. L 89-554, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 613, Congress narrowed the coverage of the statute to only those legal services needed in the
conduct of litigation in order "to express the effect of the law. As agency heads [had]
long employed, with the approval of Congress, attorneys to advise them in the conduct of their official duties, [this provision was] obsolete," Revisor's notes to 28 U.S.C.
§ 516 (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 901, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1965).
85, 28
§ 516 (1970).
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Department has concurrent administrative jurisdiction86 or where
the Attorney General or Solicitor General contests the agency decision on grounds of procedural irregularity or misapplication of a
statute, matters expressly left open to judicial review. 87 Thus, if the
Attorney General does lack the power to advocate on behalf of the
public interest, it is simply because no such power has been conferred upon him by the common law, and not because of countervailing problems of policy.
The federal judiciary has analyzed the authority of the Attorney
General to represent public interests less extensively than the state
courts have examined that authority of state attorneys general to advocate the public interest. In the absence of any constitutional provision involving the Attorney General, this analysis must proceed
from the basic legislation creating the office. As noted earlier, that
legislation fails to specify who shall determine the interests of the
United States in the event of intragovernmental conflict. 88 The question here is whether these statutes incorporate common-law doctrine
that vests the Attorney General with independent authority to advocate the public interest.
Some authority exists for ascribing to the Attorney General broad
powers to serve as an advocate of the public. It has been suggested
that the lack of substantive definition of the power and duties of the
Attorney General in the Judiciary Act of 178980 was deliberate:
under this analysis, the drafters of the Act shared a conception of
the office based on common law, and thus they saw no need to
enumerate the responsibilities associated with the position. 00 This
86. See text at note 71 supra.
87. See notes 75-77 supra and accompanying text. By providing for judicial
review of agency decisions on grounds specified in § lO(e) of the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), Congress has implicitly indicated that an
agency decision is not a definitive adjudication of the public interest.
88. See text at notes 34-46 supra.
89. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
90. 0. HAMMONDS, supra note 64, at 1.
In Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), the Court was required to construe
the constitutional provision regarding the President's power to pardon, U.S. CONST.,
art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Court prefaced its analysis with the observation that the
framers of the Constitution
were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought
and spoke in its vocabulary. . . . [and) when they came to put their conclusions
into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them
in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily
understood.
267 U.S. at 109. Since it is a familiar proposition that the acts of the first Congress reflect the founders' intent, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926),
the approach in Grossman should be employed in construction of early legislation as
well as of the Constitution, and thus the Judiciary Act of 1789 can be read as
embodying common-law principles.
State courts construing similarly laconic statutes defining the powers of the attorney general have been guided by the premise that the powers "are so numerous
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argument is not implausible. The common law can be incorporated
into federal law by statute,9 1 and the suggestion that the Judiciary
Act adopted the common-law concept of the attorney general received support in United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 92 where
the Supreme Court stated in dictum that the Judiciary Act conferred
common-law powers upon the Attorney General. 93
However, there are two persuasive reasons to reject San Jacinta's
dictum that the Attorney General enjoys common-law powers.
First, close examination. of the case demonstrates that the Court invoked the common law not to establish the standing ~f the Attorney
General to sue on his own initiative to protect the public interest,
but rather to permit the federal government to bring an action to
redress wrongs perpetrated against it. 94 The Court perceived that
to deny the Attorney General standing to sue would leave the
government without a judicial remedy. 95 Viewed in this light, the
Court's infusion of common-law doctrine into the Judiciary Act was
simply to enable the government to sue to protect its interests without the need for a special act of Congress for each type of case, 96
and not to create an independent role for the Attorney General as
a public advocate. 97
and varied that it has not been the policy of the Legislatures of the states to specifically enumerate them." State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189,
199, 155 So. 823, 827 (1934). But cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-125 (West
Supp. 1977) (lengthy enumeration of the traditional common-law powers).
91. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). See also note
47 supra.
92. 125 U.S. 273 (1888). In this case, the Court held that the lack of express
statutory authority did not bar the Attorney General from bringing suit to set aside
a land patent issued by the government.
93. Justice Miller's opinion for the Court stated that
[t]he [J]udiciary [Act] of 1789, in its third section, which first created the
office of Attorney General, without any very accurate definition of his powers,
in using the words that "there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned
in the law, to act as Attorney General for the United States," 1 Stat. 93, c.
21, § 35, must have had reference to the similar office with the same designation existing under the English law. And though it has been said that there
is no common law of the United States, it is still quite true that when Acts
of Congress use words which are familiar in the law of England, they are
supposed to be used with reference to their meaning in that law.
125 U.S. at 280. See Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note 51, at 729 n.46. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Field remarked, however, that "[t]he powers of the
executive officers of England are not vested in the executive officers of the United
States government, simply because they are called by similar names." 125 U.S.
at 307. Accord State ex rel. Winston v. Seattle Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Wash. 488, 495,
68 P. 946, 949 (1902).
94. In San Jacinto, the United States alleged that the land patent had been obtained fraudulently. 125 U.S. at 275.
95. 125 U.S. at 279-80.
96. See 125 U.S. at 280.
97. This interpretation of San Jacinto is corroborated by two subsequent cases
in which the standing of the government was at issue: United States v. American
Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888), and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). In
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A second, more important reason for denying the Attorney General common-law stature as advocate for the public interest is the
political stature of his office. Most state attorneys general are
elected officials, 98 whereas the United States Attorney General is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the President. 99 As such,
these cases; involving, respectively, the government's standing to sue to set aside a
patent and its standing to obtain an injunction against conduct disrupting interstate
commerce, the Court disposed of the standing issue without reference to the powers
of the Attorney General. The Court's analysis was predicated on the substance
of the interest the government claimed entitled it to obtain a judicial hearing. 128
U.S. at 367-70; 158 U.S. at 583-86. Once the government established that it had
a justiciable interest, the standing of the Attorney General followed from his desig•
nation as the government's advocate.
The manifold powers of the federal government to promote public interests cover
vast fields of public affairs. Because the "interests" of the federal government are
so pervasive, the Attorney General has extensive authority to advocate on behalf
of established public rights pursuant to the power granted him by 28 U.S.C. § 516
(1970). For example, the Attorney General can sue to enjoin public nuisances
deleterious to the federal interest in the "quality of air and water in their ambient
or interstate aspects," United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 346 F. Supp. 145,
149 (D. Vt. 1972), injunctive relief granted, 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.), affd. mem.,
487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), and to enjoin racially discriminatory personnel policies of state agencies administering federally funded programs, United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319 (M.D. Ala. 1968), relief granted, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D.
Ala. 1970), further opinion sub nom. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), affd., 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). However, § 516 does not authorize the Justice Department to litigate merely because it believes that the government
has an interest, United States v. Daniel, Urhahn, Seelye & Fuller, 357 F. Supp.
853, 857-58 -(N.D. Ill. 1973). Even though 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970) confers
upon the Department substantial discretionary power to articulate the public interest,
this discretion is limited by the power of Congress to deny the Attorney General
authority to bring certain actions, see United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,
27 (1947), and by the need -to satisfy the court that the government has a justiciable
interest in the case at bar, see United States v. Daniel, Urhahn, Seelye & Fuller,
357 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But cf. Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676 (D.C.
Cir. 1938), in which the court stated that the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 518 empowered the Attorney General to participate in an action "whenever he deems it for
the interest of the United States." 101 F.2d at 681 (emphasis original). This
statement seems less far reaching, however, when it is noted that the Department
attorneys appeared on behalf of defendant federal judges for injuries arising out of
judicial duties, which clearly indicates that the United States had a direct interest in
the case.
98. See note 48 supra.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1970). See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
On the power of the President to remove the Attorney General at his discretion,
see text at notes 163-72 infra.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the subordination of the Attorney General
to the President. In San Jacinto, the Court concluded its discussion of the Attorney
General's standing by noting that in exercising his powers "the Attorney General
acts as the head of one of the Executive departments, representing the authority
of the President in the class of subjects within the domain of that department and
under his control." 125 U.S. at 280. Later cases have denominated the Attorney
General "the hand of the President" in the enforcement of the laws. Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
The Court's recognition of the Attorney General's institutional role corresponds
to the historical perception of the office evidenced in the views of early Attorneys
General and of more recent commentators. See, e.g., Letter from William Wirt
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the Attorney General can claim neither formal independence from
other organs of government nor the mandate from the electorate that
a publicly elected official possesses. 100 This rationale does not
deny the Attorney General power to contest the validity of a governmental act; it stipulates only that he has no inherent power by virtue
of his office to speak for the public. Thus, the Attorney General
serves as proponent of public interests only where authorized by
Congress101 and as directed by the President.102
In sum, the United States Attorney General lacks constitutional
or electoral autonomy from the political branches of the federal
government. On one hand, he lacks an electoral constituency
of his own, and, on the other, he exercises his powers at the discre(Attorney General from 1817 to 1829) to James Polk, July 21, 1828, quoted in
H. CuMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, supra note 32, at 91. The Attorney General,
in Wirt's view, is "the confidential law adviser of the Executive branch of the government." Accord, 6 OP. ATIY. GEN. 326, 348 (1854); sources cited in note 40 supra.
100. Cf. Position Paper of Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., presented to N.Y.
Constitutional Convention, Comm. on the Executive Branch, Albany, N.Y. (June
1, 1967), quoted in REPORT, supra note 47, at 66.
To sum it up--an elected Attorney General has a measure of independence
and a sense of personal and direct responsibility to the public. The elected
official has a natural and impelling desire to be creative and to exercise broader
initiative in the service of the public. He is free of the fear of dismissal by
any superior official if he should exercise contrary independent judgme_nt. He
is in the best position to render maximum service to the People and impartial
advice to the Governor, the Legislature and State departments and agencies.
He can appear in Court without fear or favor-an attorney in the fullest and
finest sense of the word.
(emphasis original.)
The method by which the state attorney general is selected does not necessarily
correlate with possession of common-law powers. Six of the eight states in which
the attorney general is appointed grant him common-law powers, and in the other
two the question is not decided. CoMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 47, at 2021. Yet, as of 1975, the attorneys general are all elected in the seven states that
definitely do not recognize such common-law powers. REPORT, supra note 47, at
66.
101. In several important pieces of legislation creating federal causes of action
for denial of civil rights, Congress has specifically authorized the Attorney General
to intervene in actions brought under the statute. E.g., § 204(a) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (Supp. V 1975).
102. Cf. note 97 supra (broad powers to determine when such authority exists).
It has often been said or implied that United States Attorneys have, or had,
a common-law power to refuse to prosecute a person after indictment. United States
v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 19-75); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp.
100 (S.D. Ill. 1945). Brokaw declared that the United States Attorney "in his
capacity as the public prosecutor in his district is clothed with the power and charged
with the duties of the Attorney General in England under the common law." 60
F. Supp. at 101. The suggestion that they are vested with common-law authority
can be traced to the Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869), which
appear to be considered the seminal authority. In these cases, the Court ruled
that the Attorney General and the United States Attorneys (then called district
attorneys) have the power to discontinue a prosecution unless otherwise prevented
by statute. The Court stated that this doctrine was incontrovertible. It cited no
authority, but pointed out that at common law and in admiralty, a litigant may
relinquish his suit at any time. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 457-58. Presumably the
Court adverted to the common law and admiralty as illustrations of the wide
currency of the principle, not as the source of th~ holding.
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tion of superior organs of the government. It must be concluded,
therefore, that in resolving rival claims for representation the Attorney General-and, hence, the Solicitor GeneraP 03-is ultimately responsible to the Executive. This conclusion, though true to the historical record, 104 is inconsistent with the view that the Solicitor General is to exercise autonomous judgment in choosing the position that
best serves the interest of "the United States." This inconsistency
suggests the appropriateness of an inquiry into the desirability of an
autonomous Solicitor General. For if we are to seek institutional
change to make the Solicitor General accountable to Congress or,
even more radically, revise our political norms to allow the Solicitor
General complete autonomy from both political branches, we must
be certain that the change is warranted.

III.

BALANCING AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

To determine the desired scope of the Solicitor General's
autonomy, it is important to examine the three principal contexts in
which intragovernmental conflicts involving the Solicitor General
arise: agency litigation, conflicts between the Congress and the Executive, and conflicts within the executive department.
A.

Agency Litigation

The Solicitor General is called upon to resolve two kinds of conflicts arising out of his authority over agency litigation. First, when
two agencies present competing views, the Solicitor General must
choose from among his responsibilities to his government "clients." 10 G
Second, when he disagrees with the position taken by an agency,
he must choose between his responsibility to the government and his
responsibility to the public interest.106
In analyzing the Solicitor General's resolution of these conflicts,
it is helpful to devote some attention to the question whether the
Solicitor General's role in agency litigation should be eliminated.
Two possible alternatives to the existing system may be suggested:
each agency might be given control over its own litigation,107 or the
103. See text at notes 31-33 supra.
104. See text at notes 31-40 supra.
105. This conflict may occur in two types of cases-when two agencies are adversaries and, more commonly, when the agencies appear as proponents of competing
views in litigation in which a private party has challenged the action of one of
the agencies. See, e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); St. Regis Paper Co.
v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
106. This disagreement may surface either at the certiorari stage or at argument
on the merits. See Note, supra note 3, at 1461-64; text at notes 13-14 & 18-19
supra. See also text at notes 115-31 infra.
107. See note 3 supra.
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management of agency litigation could be handled by an office independent of the Executive. Congress undoubtedly has the power to
adopt either of these proposals, 108 ·but the advantages of the existing
system appear to outweigh the risks of radical change, even though
some agencies may be embittered by the omnipresence of the
Solicitor General. 100
Leaving the decision to seek Supreme Court review to one office familiar with both the government's caseload and the attitudes
of the Court is in the best interest of all concerned. The Solicitor
General is often in a better position than an agency, and perhaps
even the Court, to determine whether a particular case is propitious
for deciding an issue, 110 and, as noted above, both the government
and the Court benefit from the Solicitor General's screening of
agency petitions. 111
· Further benefits accrue from placing the conduct of argument
on the merits in the Court under the direction of one officer. Because the purview of his office is so broad, the Solicitor General can
attempt to coordinate policies originating from different quarters of
the government, and at least should be able to establish priorities
and thereby avert or mitigate incongruity in government policy.
When a collision between positions espoused by two or more agencies is inescapable, the Solicitor General, because of his relative disinterest, may provide the Court with a trustworthy reading of the
record and the competing policies. 112
It appears unlikely that a bureau independent of the Executive,
responsible solely for directing agency litigation, could replicate the
benefits associated with the centralization of this responsibility in an
office based in the executive branch. It is true that eliminating the
Solicitor General's control of agency litigation would remove a po108. The power to establish an independent office to handle agency litigation
follows from the power to arrange for the conduct of agency litigation.
109. The CAB lobbied for over a decade in a vain effort to achieve self-control
of its litigation. Note, supra note 3, at 1451 n.48.
Admittedly, management of an agency's litigation in the appellate courts by adventitious counsel unavoidably derogates from the agency's independence. See MacIntyre, The Status of Regulatory Independence, 29 FED. B.J. 1, 7-8 (1969). Cf.
the preamble to the 1973 "interim" legislation giving the FTC the power to conduct
its own litigation, Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(a) (1), 87
Stat. 591: "The Congress hereby finds that the investigative and law enforcement
responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission have been restricted and hampered
because of inadequate legal authority to enforce subpoenas and to seek preliminary
injunctive relief to avoid unfair competitive practices." The influence the Attorney
General had over FTC policy before the passage of this law is illustrated by FTC
v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927).
110. The Solicitor General has occasionally advised an agency that its chances
of prevailing on an issue before the Court would be improved if it waited for a
more favorable factual setting. Note, supra note 3, at 1457.
111. See text at note 18 supra; note 24 supra and accompanying text.
112. See Note, supra note 3, at 1467.
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tential source of executive distortion of the policies of supposedly
independent bodies,113 but the executive affiliation of the Solicitor
General is a major reason for his ability to supervise agency litigation
effectively. Because the Solicitor General oversees virtually all
government agencies, he can identify for the Court the legitimate
executive interests raised in a particular case. 114 Furthermore, because his responsibility to the administrative agencies is only part of
his total responsibility, he has a stronger basis for taking a position
contrary to an agency than would an official responsible solely for
agency litigation.
Assuming, then, that the Solicitor General will retain control of
most agency litigation, how should he resolve the conflicts that arise
out of that capacity? The resolution of the conflicts involves two
problems: whether to petition for certiorari and how to formulate
the Solicitor General's argument on the merits. As for approving
certiorari petitions, the Solicitor General should continue to exercise
discretion by weighing the significance of the issues presented, the
_strength of the agency's position, and the receptivity of the Court. 11 G
Only by retaining this prerogative to withhold approval can the Solicitor General serve both the Court's and the government's interest
in narrowing attention to the cases of greatest import. If the Solie. itor General determines that a case presents an issue worthy of
certiorari, 116 he should file the petition unless he believes that review
of the case by the Court is inappropriate117 or impropitious. 118 The
Solicitor General should not veto a petition of a "certworthy" case
merely because he disapproves of the policies that the agency is pursuing. Because it is difficult to determine whether a policy dispute
is the determining factor in the decision not to petition, the Solicitor
General should resolve any doubts in favor of the agency. By following this course, he can fulfill his responsibilities to screen out unworthy cases and to check an overreaching agency-in this context,
by allowing a lower court decision to stand-without significantly intruding upon matters rightfully decided by the agency. Finally, it
113. See text at notes 144-45 infra.
114. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10 (1963), where the Solicitor General, in an amicus brief for the United
States supporting a challenge to a decision of the NLRB, pointed out that the Board's
decision would have a serious detrimental impact on foreign relations.
115. For a description of the Solicitor General's practice regarding certiorari petitions, see Note, supra note 3, at 1453-57. In arguing for preservation. of the Solicitor General's responsibility for agency petitions, this Note reaches the same conclusion presented in id. at 1457-59.
116. See SUP. Cr. R. 19(11) for the Court's announced considerations bearing
upon the decision whether to grant certiorari.
117. If, for example, the record is irremediably defective.
118. If, for example, the agency's position is not presented in a favorable factual
setting.
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is not the role of the Solicitor General to make ultimate decisions
on questions of law or fact. Thus, he should ordinarily request that
the Court review those cases that present issues -over which reasonable
disagreement exists. 119
In arguing an agency case on the merits, the Solicitor General's
first loyalty must be to the agency. 120 Although the Solicitor General does have the prerogative to contest the position of an agency
on the merits, 121 his responsibility for the management of agency
litigation is not a license to impose his own views of the best interests
of the government. The value of centralized management. of agency
litigation would be lost if the Solicitor General routinely opposed
an agency. Moreover, the Solicitor General's refusal to present the
views of an agency may deprive the Court of a balanced presentation
of the relevant governmental interests. 122
Despite the persuasive reasons for giving primary consideration
to serving the agencies, the Solicitor General should retain discretion
to oppose them. That opposition is unavoidable when two agencies
assert adverse positions. 123 In these situations the Solicitor Gen119. On a few occasions the Solicitor General has refused to authorize the filing
of a petition for certiorari even though the cases presented sufficiently important
issues to merit certiorari because he could not in good conscience dispute the lower
court's opinion. See Note, supra note 3, at 1455-56. Even in these situations,
unless he believes that the ruling is so clearly correct that review by the Court
would be a waste of time, the Solicitor General should allow the agency to file
a petition itself while he files an opposing petition.
'
120. See Stern, supra note 6, at 769.
121. According to one study, the Solicitor General openly disagrees with an
agency in a case heard on the merits about six to ten times a term. Note, supra
note 3, at 1461.
122. See United States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 663 (1964) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), in which the Justice Department challenged a merger previously approved by the Federal Power Commission. Justice
Harlan observed that the Court lacked a balanced exposition of the public interests
at stake because no brief was submitted by the Commission. See also Note, supra
note 3, at 1466-67.
A striking instance of attempted suppression of the position of one gowmment
agency by the Department of Justice occurred during, the extended litigation under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of wage claims of workers employed by firms with
cost-plus contracts with the Government during World War II. See, e.g., Powell
v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950); Kennedy v. Silas- Mason Co.,
334 U.S. 249 (1948), discussed in Stem, supra note 6, at 765-67. The Department
of the Army and the Department of Labor disagreed upon the validity of the claims.
The Justice Department refused to allow government attorneys to raise the defense that the FLSA did not apply to these workers. The Department also advised private attorneys not to press the argument. The Department relented after
several lower courts held the defense valid, but was vindicated by the Court's ruling
in Powell that the workers were covered by the Act.
123. See note 105 supra. The Solicitor General has sometimes adopted a neutral
stance in such cases by presenting no argument, see United States ex rel. Chapman
v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953) (suit between Secretary of the Interior and the FPC),
but this practice evidently has been abandoned, see Note, supra note 3, at 1465.
Of course, the Solicitor General could furnish his analysis in an impartial format,
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eral's advocacy may be especially useful to the Court because his
position enables him to judge the likely ramifications of the opposing
demands. 124 The Solicitor General's opposition to the merits of an
agency's decision presents a harder problem when that opposition
rests upon his own view of the validity of the agency's position rather
than on the stance of another agency. In the former circumstance,
the Solicitor General steps outside the typical role of advocate for
an institutional entity in order to promote broader government
interests. The legal prerogative of the Solicitor General to support
a challenge to an agency action on grounds that the agency misconstrued an applicable statute, made inadequate findings of fact, or violated constitutional rights has not been questioned. 1211 The cases in
which the Solicitor General has raised those objections seem to
illustrate his commitment to broad government and public interests.126 However, closer inspection of the cases cited in one indepth study of the Solicitor General's work127 reveals that, in those
cases in which the Solicitor General contested an agency's decision
on the merits, the subject matter of the decision was in fact within
the administrative jurisdiction of the Executive. 128 Consequently, it
is arguable that the Solicitor General is more often prompted to contest an agency's decision by concern for the jurisdiction of the Executive than by concern for the public's interest in the integrity of
agency decisionmaking. 129
but concealment of bis partiality may be unrealistic and undesirable when he favors
one side.
124. See the Solicitor General's analysis of the first amendment issues raised
by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in Brief for the Attorney General as
Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae.
125. See generally cases discussed in Note, supra note 3, at 1459-67. See also
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 R2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S.
707 ( 1943). In his celebrated opinion in Associated Industries announcing the theory of the "private Attorney General," Judge Frank asserted that Congress "can
constitutionally authorize one of its own officials, such as the Attorney General,
to bring a proceeding to prevent another official from acting in violation of his
statutory powers; for then an actual controversy exists, and the Attorney General
can properly be vested with authority, in such a controversy, to vindicate the interest
of the public oi:: the government." 134 F.2d at 704.
126. See text at notes 13-15 supra.
127. Note, supra note 3, at 1459-67.
128. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Federal Maritime Commn., 390 U.S.
261 (1968) (antitrust enforcement); United States v. First City Natl. Bank, 386
U.S. 361 (1967) (same); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (foreign affairs). See also note 129 infra.
129. A large proportion of the cases in which the Solicitor General contests
an agency action involve the ICC, the one agency that has a long-standing .statutory
right to control its own litigation, see note 3 supra. One can speculate that, because
of this distinct status of the ICC, the Solicitor General has not felt as constrained
by the responsibilities of his office to defend the ICC as he would be with other
agencies. Alternatively, the disproportionate presence of ICC and, to a lesser extent,
of Federal Maritime Commission cases among those in which the Solicitor General
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That the Solicitor General's discretion to oppose an agency in
order to promote the public interest is limited by his responsibilities
to the agencies and by his representation of exe_cutive interests does
not mean that he should be foreclosed from doing so. Many states
have affirmed the value of according the government's advocate
the power to place the public interest above the claims of an
agency. 13° Furthermore, as a practical matter, prohibiting the Solicitor General from presenting views opposing an agency might tempt
him either to keep a certworthy case from the Court in order to avoid
reversal of the lower court decision or to disguise his opposition to
the agency by misrepresenting its view to the Court. 131
Finally, the Solicitor General's authority to supervise agency
litigation can be justified on a more theoretical level. The advent
of the administrative agency has severely distorted the Constitution's
original conception of the separation of powers. 132 This distortion
has necessitated an adjustment in the scheme of checks and balances,
which maintains the proper distribution of powers among the
branches of the federal government. By exercising his supervlsory
powers to restrain agency violations of individual rights and the
usurpation of authority entrusted to other departments of the government, 133 the Solicitor General furnishes a unique check on the independent agencies.
has opposed an agency could be explained by the power of the Solicitor General
to keep other agencies who are unsuccessful in the Court of Appeals out of the
Supreme Court by refusing to authorize petitions for certiorari.
130. See text at notes 58-61 supra.
131. Agencies occasionally complain that the Solicitor General dilutes their positions in order to mitigate a clash with another agency. Note, supra note 3, at
1467.
132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-81 (1976) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
133. The Solicitor General's check on agency assertions is, of course, a qualified
one. Although the Solicitor General may argue against an agency on the merits,
the decision remains the province of the Court. It is worth noting that the opposition of the Solicitor General is not always a death knell for the agency. See,
e.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). The control over
petitions for certiorari partakes more of the nature of a conclusive veto in t}).at
an agency may irretrievably lose a particular case. Nonetheless, the agency may
be able to circumvent the Solicitor General by trying to win on the same arguments
in a different circuit and hoping that the opposing party will petition for certiorari,
or by convincing a private party to intervene on the side of the agency and to
petition for certiorari if the agency loses. See Note, supra note 3, at 1453. Depending on the subject matter of the dispute, the agency may also look to Congress
for relief.
Ultimately, the Solicitor General must be and, history suggests, can be trusted
to avoid persistent abuse of his office in contravention of agency independence.
The occupants of the office recognize that exercising the discretion to deny an agency
access to the Court for political ends would dissolve the confidence reposed in him
by the Court and dissipate the value of the office. See Bork Hearings, supra note
12, at 10-11 (statement by Solicitor General-designate Bork).
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Congress and the Executive

The second kind of intragovemmental conflict involving the Solicitor General is disagreement between Congress and the Executive.
These disputes fall into two classes: those involving the respective
powers of the two branches and those involving the constitutionality
of congressional acts not impinging upon the separation of powers. 134
The Solicitor General and the Department of Justice135 have almost
without exception defended the validity of executive acts, but they
have not shown similar loyalty to ·acts of Congress. 136 This disparity
seems inconsistent with the coequal stature of Congress and the Executive. Congressional pronouncements represent the "interests" of
the United States with at least as much authority as executive decisions, and the "institutional" prerogatives of Congress are as essential to the constitutional scheme of government as are those of the
Executive.137
So long as the Solicitor General remains an officer of the executive branch this asymmetry in his commitments to the two political
branches of the government is not surprising,138 and it does not seriously distort the equality between them. 139 When Congress or one
of its subdivisions litigates as a party, it undoubtedly prefers representation by counsel responsible solely to it, and Congress has ready
134. Some cases represent hybrid situations. In United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department attacked a statute as both an invasion
of executive prerogatives and a denial of constitutional rights of individuals.
135. The posture of the Solicitor General cannot be considered in isolation in
those cases where the position of the government is formulated, in the first instance,
by other attorneys in the Justice Department. The Solicitor General plays no formal
part in government litigation until a case reaches the appellate stage. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.20 (1977). And, although the Solicitor General can repudiate the position argued by the Department attorneys in the lower courts, by "confessing error," see
Note, supra note 15, the position of the Executive is articulated before the Solicitor
General enters the case.
1136. See text at notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
137. The Court has recognized that Congress' interests are entitled to representation in litigation involving the separation of powers. Justice Frankfurter commented
that "[n]ot the least significant aspect of [the Myers case] is that on the Court's
special invitation Senator George Wharton Pepper . . . presented the position of
Congress at the bar of this Court." Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353
(1958). See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), discussed in note 140
infra.
138. Cf. Matthew 6:24 (King James) ("No man can serve two masters •••").
The focus of the analysis here is the relative claims of Congress and the President for the services of the Solicitor General. Therefore, it is assumed that
the personal views of the Solicitor General are immaterial. The implications of
conflict between the Solicitor General and the President are considered in text at
notes 144-57 infra.
139. Unlike disputes among administrative agencies, litigation of the respective
powers of Congress and the Executive does not entail sorting out overlapping administrative policies. Thus, there is less need for a disinterested decisionmaker familiar
with the workings of the government. Cf. text at note 112 supra.
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means to obtain such counsel. 140 Although Congress' advocate may
not carry the aura of the Solicitor General, the Court no doubt recognizes that in litigation in which the Congress and the Executive are
adversaries, the Solicitor General acts as an attorney for the President.
Similar reasoning governs in interdepartmental disputes over
congressional acts not affecting the institutional interests of the Executive. Before reaching the question of the Solicitor General's role
in such matters, however, one must consider whether the Executive·
has standing to challenge such actions. If standing exists, it is clear
that the Solicitor General could assert it on behalf of the Executive.
One may argue that the Executive, by virtue of its constitutional
duty to faithfully execute the laws, is precluded from applying for
judicial rescission of congressional enactments.141 This theory, however, has not barred the Executive from contesting the constitutionality of statutes that allegedly infringe upon executive powers. 142
Yet when the Executive-through the Solicitor General--opposes a
statute not involving the respective powers of the two branches of
government, it is arguable that Congress suffers a serious deprivation
of representation. By hypothesis, however, one p~ in these cases
seeks to uphold the statute and thus supports the congressional in140. In the past, when the Justice Department has either aligned itself with
the party adverse to Congress or maintained neutrality, Congress or a congressional
committee has retained private counsel, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946); Er parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868), further opinion, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), or committee counsel, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), affd., 498
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In one case, an individual member of Congress argued
pro se. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Several bills have
been introduced in recent years to establish a permanent office of congressional
counsel, which would represent Congress or any part thereof when party to a lawsuit
arising out of official action. See S. 495, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201-203 (1976);
H.R. 14795, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201-203 (1976); S. 2036, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 401, 402 (1975); S. 2615, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3(a)(5) (1973). In Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in which the Solicitor General attacked the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the removal of a postmaster by the President
before expiration of the postmaster's term of office, a senator as amicus curiae
presented a brief and oral argument in favor of the statute at the request of the
Court. 272 U.S. at 176. Individual members of Congress submitted several amicus
briefs supporting the statute challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
The proposals for establishment of an office of congressional counsel also provided that such counsel could intervene or appear as amicus curiae to defend a
federal statute in any action wherein its constitutionality is brought into question.
See S. 495, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 205(a)(1) (1976); H.R. 14795, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 203(d)(1) (1976); S. 2036, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402(a)(4)(A) (1975);
S. 2615, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (4) (1973).
141. In light of the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, the President's
duty to execute the laws might be read as a duty to execute only those laws that
are constitutional. An executive challenge to a statute may thus be consistent with
the faithful execution clause. Were the "laws" of the latter clause construed to
include the Constitution as well as statutes, one might even argue that the Executive
is obligated to challenge statutes it deems unconstitutional.
142. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 26-27 supra.
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terest, and Congress can arrange for presentation of its views as an
amicus. 143

'C.

Intra-Executive Conflict

Conflict between the Solicitor General and the President may
arise in any area of the Solicitor General's work. In adjudging the
obligation of the Solicitor General to abide by a presidential command, a distinction must first be drawn between the Solicitor General's management of agency litigation and his representation of the
government in cases arising out of the administration of executive
functions. In regard to agency litigation, the Solicitor General
should rebuff efforts by the President to dictate or to influence the
decisions on certiorari petitions and the formulation of argument presented for the agency. It is proper for the Solicitor General to present the views of the Executive to the Court in cases pertinent to
matters within executive jurisdiction, but the Solicitor General must
take care to separate these views from those of the agency involved
in the dispute. Failure to do so may jeopardize agency independ~
ence. Therefore, when the Solicitor General believes that his
espousal of the executive position unfairly colors his representation
of the agency, he should allow the agency to speak for itself rather
than attempt to present both positions or, even worse, surreptitiously
compromise the agency's claims.
Although the views of the Executive on issues within its administrative domain should be presented, the Executive has no license
to intercede in litigation of the independent agencies. The legitimacy of the Solicitor General's control over agency litigation is
premised upon the notion that executive preferences do not dictate
whether the Solicitor General will petition for certiorari or contest,
in his role as watchdog for the public, the legality of an agency decision.144 The Executive should respect the autonomy of the Solicitor General in this area because the Solicitor General's authority to
handle agency litigation is derived from tacit congressional delegation.145 Presidential meddling in agency litigation, therefore, constitutes an intrusion on both the independence of the agency and
the obligations of the Solicitor General to Congress.
Different considerations govern the role of the Solicitor General
in cases in which the Executive becomes a party in order to discharge
143. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v, United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), discussed in note 140 supra.
144. One may presume that the President would disagree with the Solicitor General's decision not because of a differing legal analysis but rather because of political motives.
145. See note 3 supra. Congress can delegate to an executive officer administrative responsibilities comparable to those typically delegated to an independent agency,
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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its responsibility to execute the laws. It is useful to divide this area
of governmental litigation into cases in which the Executive is necessarily a party-criminal prosecutions and civil actions involving executive agencies or claims against the United States-and cases in
which it appears by discretion--,as an intervenor146 or as an amicus
curiae. Given that "executive power" is vested by the Constitution
exclusively in the President,147 the government's attorneys serve as
agents of the President in both kinds of cases148 and must, therefore,
comply with his instructions. 149 It has been suggested, however, that
the Solicitor General should not defer to the executive position when
it offends constitutional rights, 150 on the theory that the public interest in the lawfulness of official action is as compelling in the sphere
of executive action as it is in the domain of the administrative agencies. Conceivably, then, the Solicitor General could promote this
interest as adversary to the Executive. The Solicitor General may,
of course, render his opinion to the President on the legality of a
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970), as amended by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-381, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1120.
147. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.
148. The Solicitor General's claim to independence from the President is arguably
stronger when he appears as an intervenor or amicus since he does so on behalf
of himself as protector of the public interest, not on behalf of the President, see
text at notes 8-12 supra. Cf. Note, supra note 3, at 1478-79 (observing that the
Solicitor General exercises the greatest independence in his appearances as amicus
in cases involving fundamental issues of constitutional law).
It may also be argued that when the United States intervenes under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2403 (1970), the Government's attorneys appear on behalf of Congress. See text
at notes 41-43 supra. The discretion allowed the Attorney General under § 2403
suggests otherwise, however. See text at notes 44-46 supra. Compare § 2403 with
intervention provisions of the various bills introduced to establish an office of congressional counsel cited in note 140 supra.
149. The Watergate Special Prosecutor Wal}, of course, an obvious exception.
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-95 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld
the Special Prosecutor's authority to sue the President in the name of the United
States. The decision does not contradict the President's position as the highest executive authority insofar as the Court rested its ruling on the delegation of authority
by the President's subordinate, the Attorney General, to the Special Prosecutor, 38
Fed. Reg. 30738 (1973), as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32805 (1973), which specifically authorized the Special Prosecutor to contest a claim of executive privilege. See
418 U.S. at 694-96. Cf. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (President's dismissal of Special Prosecutor Cox illegal so long as regulation prohibiting
unilateral dismissal, 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (1973), remained in effect). It has been
argued that insofar as the Special Prosecutor in Nixon claimed to act on behalf
of one executive interest-the conduct of a criminal investigation-and the President
opposed his request for documents on grounds of another executive interest-the
confidentiality of executive communications-the Special Prosecutor's judgment of
which executive interest should prevail as the position of the executive should have
been subordinated to the judgment of the President. Van Alstyne, A Political and
Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 116, 133
( 1974). One can, however, read the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's
powers as a delegation of the prerogative to determine, as well as to sue on behalf
of, the primary executive interest in matters within the scope of his authority.
150. Werdegar, supra note 29, at 513.
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proposed course of action, 151 and he may withdraw from a case152
or, in the extreme, resign if he cannot in good conscience advocate
the position adopted by the Executive. However, he has no institutional warrant to oppose the President.
In _practice, serious conflict between the Solicitor General and
the President is probably rare. The President, after all, commands
the power of removal, and thus a Solicitor General interested in retaining his position would ordinarily defer to the President's will.
More significantly, by appointing a Solicitor General whose political
persuasion he shares and whose legal judgment he respects, the
President can minimize the likelihood of conflict over the conduct
of the Executive's litigation.
Nevertheless, situations may arise in which the Solicitor General
would, in the absence of practical restraint, defy the President, either
by refusing to adyocate the position adopted by the President or by
submitting an argument rejected by the President. Despite the apparent desirability of allowing the Solicitor General a great degree of
autonomy, it is difficult to support a claimed prerogative to defy the
President.
The values militating in favor of autonomy do not
pertain in the context of litigation involving the Executive. Independence enables the Solicitor General to assist the Court by providing
a detached exposition of competing claims1 G3 and to speak for the
public interest when government actors violate the law. He can
serve the Court in an advisory capacity in conflicts between two
administrative agencies because in such cases he occupies a position
of relative disinterest and because proper resolution of the issues
may require analysis by one familiar with the complexities of administrative policy. 154 When, however, the Executive is an adversary,
the Solicitor General does not occupy this neutral position. Moreover, in cases not involving complex administrative matters, the
Court's need for disinterested counsel is reduced. 155
Furthermore, the Solicitor General does not have the political
legi~imacy to advocate on behalf of "the United States" independent
of Congress and the -President. In this respect, the Solicitor General's opposition to an administrative agency is distinguishable from
his oppo&ition to the President. Agencies are subordinate arms of
the government that exercise authority only by delegation, and thus
151. See Hearings on S. 2803 & S. 2978, supra note 40, at 190 (&tatement of
former Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin).
152. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), discussed in Lewis, supra
note 14, at 27.
153. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
154. See text at note 112 supra.
155. This does not mean that the Solicitor General cannot make a valuable
contribution to constitutional litigation, as his amicus practice overwhelmingly demonstrates. See Note, supra note 3, at 1478-79.
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when the Solicitor General disputes an agency he does so with the
tacit authorization of Congress. The Solicitor General can claim no
similar warrant to argue adverse to the Executive.156
The conclusion that the Solicitor General can advocate only
under the auspices of a branch of the federal government is supported by an examination of the authority of state attorneys general.
In all but a handful of states, the attorney general is elected and,
therefore, has a popular mandate to express the public interest and
enjoys freedom from the institutional constraint implicit in the absence of tenure. Most states have enhanced the stature of the attorney general by conferring common-law powers on that office. 157 In
the federal scheme, the authority to express the sovereign will has
not been dispersed so broadly as in the states. The Solicitor General, it follows, can exercise such authority only under the aegis of
Congress or the President.
IV.

ALTERING THE BALANCE THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Under existing law, the Solicitor General operates in an executive capacity. Consequently, he is ultimately responsible to the
President and must comply with his bidding. Because the statutory
scheme dictates this relationship, some attention must be given to
the question whether the Constitution would allow an alternative
scheme in which the Solicitor General would be either truly autonomous or held accountable solely to Congress. The answer to this
question is shaped by the definition and allocation of the power to
appoint government officials, the power to set the terms of their
removal, and the power to dictate their conduct.
156. The Solicitor General's opposition to a governmental litigant acting in the
name of the United States may legitimately occur in two situations. The first arises
where the United States is denominated as a defendant in certain actions brought
against independent agencies. For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 2322 (1970), the
"United States" is a party defendant in an action appealing an ICC decision. Thus,
when the federal government, as a shipper, challenges an ICC ruling, the suit is
technically "United States v. United States." See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S.
426 (1949). In the second, more significant, situation the Solicitor General could
oppose "the United States" where the United States is represented by Congress,
since at least one court has recognized that Congress can authorize itself or one
of its committees to sue in the name of the United States. Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1973),
further opinion, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), affd., 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1974). See Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, Part II, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1288, 1334 n.631 (1965). But cf. The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 370 (1867), where the Supreme Court declared in dictum that "in causes
where the United States is a party, and is represented by the Attorney-General,
. . . no counsel can be heard in opposition on behalf of any other of the departments
of the government." - 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 371. That statement appears to be
limited to opposition by other executive departments, however.
157. See notes 55-61 supra and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the powers of appointment, Buckley v. Valeo, 158 forecloses any argument that the appointment of the Solicitor Gener,al may escape the requirements of
the appointments clause. 159 Although the Court in Buckley failed
to define who is an "officer of the United States," it emphasized that
any official with "responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the
courts of the United States for vindicating public rights" is such an
officer. 160 As the Solicitor General clearly meets this description,
the only alternative to the present method of filling that office would
be to vest the power uf appointment solely in the President, the head
of an executive department, or the judiciary. 161 Of these possibilities,
only the last would diminish executive control over. selection of the
Solicitor General. That procedure, however, would offend the concept of separation of judge and advocate and would oblige the judiciary to undertake an unfamiliar administrative responsibility. 162
Restricting the President's power to remove the Solicitor General
is a second possible means of allowing the Solicitor General greater
independence. Were the Solicitor General appointed for an absolute term of years or dismissible only for cause, 163 he could defy the
President without jeopardizing his employment. The validity of this
limitation on the power of removal is measured by the two landmark
cases in this area, Myers v. United States164 and Humphrey's Executor v. United States. 165 These cases indicate that the touchstone
of whether the Executive possesses absolute removal power is the
"character of the office" in question. 166 Thus, Congress has the constitutional power to shield the Solicitor General from peremptory dismissal by the President only if the conduct of the United States' litigation does not represent primarily an executive function. 167
158. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
159. U.S. CONST., art. n, § 2, cl. 2.
160. 424 U.S. at 140.
161. Such alternatives would be permitted only if the Solicitor General were
deemed an "inferior officer." U.S. CoNsT., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
162. Courts have traditionally shunned responsibility for choosing governmental
officials. See, e.g., Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973). But cf,
28 U.S.C. § 546 (19170) (federal district court authorized to appoint a United States
attorney in event of a vacancy); but see TENN. CONST., art. 6, § 5 (attorney general
appointed by the state supreme court). Although the original Senate version of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 93, provided for appointment of the United
States Attorney General by the Supreme Court and of United States Attorneys by
the district courts, the final version provided for Presidential appointment. 0, HAMMONDS, supra note 64, at 23.
163. See, e.g., the provisions for the appointment of commissioners of the Federal
Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 4'1 (1976); and of the members of the National
Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1970).
164. 272 U.S. 52 (1926):
165. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
166. 295 U.S. at 631; accord, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
167. See Note, supra note 35, at 397-405. But cf. id. at 399 (arguing that
the conduct of litigation is an executive function).
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It has been established that the power to institute and conduct
litigation for the United States is not reserved exclusively for the
Executive. 168 Moreover, the prerogative of Congress to delegate to
an independent agency the authority to conduct litigation in the enforcement of its rules and decisions suggests that Congress has an
underlying power to control the conduct of all litigation to which the
United States is a party, since in theory Congress cannot delegate
a power it does not possess. However, the anomalous situation of
the independent agencies should not govern the mainstreams of the
separation-of-powers doctrine. 169 When the Court has expounded
upon the faithful execution clause,170 it has consistently found that
the provision vests in the Executive the power to conduct the litigation of the United States.171 Most recently, the Court declared that
"[a] lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is
to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution
entrusts the responsibility to 'talce Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.' " 172 The inescapable conclusion is that, although the
Court may countenance parceling a limited measure of the power to
execute the laws in the name of the United States to an independent
agency with narrowly defined jurisdiction, the Court does adhere to
the precept that this power is in the main an executive power. It
follows that the removal doctrine proscribes compromising the President's authority to remove the Solicitor General.
The third question bearing on the ability of Congress to limit the
President's control of the Solicitor General is the extent to which
Congress may regulate the Solicitor General's conduct. 173 Executive
168. FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968); ICC v. Chatsworth Coop.
Marketing Assn., 347 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965); notes
3 & 140 supra. Cf. S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972)
(Congress can disqualify the Justice Department from challenging a decision of a
government agency adverse to the government); United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19, 27 (1947) (Congress can deny the Attorney General authority to prosecute
for the government a specified category of claims).
169. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-81 (1976) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) ("There is no doubt that the development of the administrative agency in response to modem legislative and administrative need has placed
severe strain on the separation-of-powers principle in its pristine formulation").
170. U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 3.
171. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), in which the Court intimated that
the duties assigned to executive departments are obligations imposed upon the Executive by the faithful execution clause that the President cannot perform personally.
The Court referred specifically to United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S.
273 (1888), as illustrating the proposition that the Attorney General performs executive duties in bringing suit to protect the interests of the United States. 135
U.S. at 63-64, 66-67. See also Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922), in which
the Court equated "taking care that the laws be faithfully executed" with "protection
of the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution
of offenses." 258 U.S. at 262.
172. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976).
173. For example, Congress could amend the intervention statute, 28 U.S.C.
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officials are not at liberty to ignore legislation mandating performance of prescribed action, 174 and the Supreme Court has specifically
acknowledged the power of Congress to superintend the operations
of the Justice Department. 175
Beyond these generalizations, however, the federal courts have
not clarified the limits of Congress' power to direct executive action.
Judicial discourse on the Executive's duty to "take Care that ,the Laws
be faithfully executed" has suggested both that the Executive commands a certain iirreducible discretion in this duty176 and, conversely,
that this discretion might exist only by grace of Congress. 177 One
of the early leading Supreme Court cases on this subject appears to
adopt both positions.178 Although it might be argued that the duty
§ 2403 (1970), to mandate that the Justice Department intervene in all cases in
which a statute is attacked and defend the statute. Moreover, conceivably, Congress
could either direct the position to be argued by the Solicitor General through special
legislation for a particular case or require the Solicitor General to secure approval
of his proposed argument from a congressional committee. On the use by Congress
of the concurrent resolution and committee veto to control executive action, see
generally Watson. Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 995-1029 (1975).
174. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
State Highway Commn. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973 ). Even where
the discharge of statutory responsibility requires exercise of discretionary judgment,
an executive official can be compelled to exercise this discretion in a manner consistent with the statutory guidelines. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376
F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
175. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). In the words of Justice
Van Devanter, "the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties
of the Attorney General and the duties of his assistants, are all subject to regulation
by congressional legislation." 273 U.S. at 178.
176. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Boyd
v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp.
630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
177. Compare United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274 (1911), with Powell v.
Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966).
178. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458 (1869). The uncertainty
of the courts is manifested in cases addressing the question whether a United States
Attorney has the prerogative to decline or to drop prosecution for a federal offense.
In answering in the affirmative, several courts have both adverted to the doctrine
that prosecutorial discretion is an inherent power of the Executive and have looked
to the statute defining the offense for an indication that Congress intended to allow
the Executive discretion on whether to prosecute. See Boyd v. United States, 345
F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963).
See also Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1973), where the Second Circuit explained that a prosecutor's decision not
to prosecute is not subject to judicial review because, "[i]n the absence of statutorily
defined standards governing reviewability, or regulatory or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do
not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary." 477 F.2d at 380. The court
rejected the argument that Congress withdrew the normal prosecutorial discretion
on prosecutions for violations of a person's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1987
(1970) by providing that United States Attorneys are "authorized and required"
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of faithful execution means simply that the Executive must carry out
the laws as directed by Congress,179 the assertion that Congress can
exact from the Executive unflinching adherence to its will in the "execution of the laws" contravenes persuasive authority construing
the separation of powers implicit in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution creates
a sphere of exclusive executive authority. In Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 180 a leading case sustaining the power of a court
to compel an executive official to comply with a statutory command,
the Court emphasized that "[t]he mandamus does not seek to direct
or control the postmaster general in the discharge of any offici&l
duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act, which neither he
nor the President had any authority to deny or control."181 It has
been argued that whether a responsibility is "ministerial" or "discretionary" is a matter of congressional design, 182 but the Court in Kendall recognized a distinction between the performance of constitutional responsibilities of the Executive and the implementation of
congressional decisions on matters within the authority of Congress.
When the power exercised resides wholly in Congress, the official
designated to perform the action is an agent of Congress and is thus
obligated to follow its instructions. 188 When the Executive acts purto institute prosecution. 477 F.2d at 381. However, the court expressly left open
the question whether a court could command prosecution if Congress explicitly denied the prosecutor any discretion. 477 F.2d at 382.
179. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), in which the court stated that the "constitutional duty [of the President
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed] does not permit the President
to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the Congress as those laws are
construed by the judiciary." This case involved a statute directing the President
to approve a salary schedule for certain federal employees.
180. 37 U.S. ( 12 Pet.) 524 (1838). The issue in Kendall was whether the federal
courts could issue a writ of mandamus directing the Postmaster General to credit the
account of a contractor who had performed services for the post office in an amount
determined by the Solicitor of the Treasury.
181. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610 (emphasis added).
182. Note, Discretion To Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 14 YALE L.J.
1297, 1305 (1965). A duty is ministerial, the argument goes, if the statute giving
rise to it is so detailed and categorical that it precludes deviation from its terms.
See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930):
Where an administrative duty imposed by statute on an executive officer is
so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a positive
command it is regarded as being so far ministerial that its performance may
be compelled by mandamus, unless there be provision or implication to tpe
contrary.
There is language in Kendall supporting this approach. In the Court's reading of
tho statute, "[t]here is no room for the exercise of any discretion, official or otherwise: all that is shut out by the direct and positive command of the law, and
the act required to be done is, in every just sense, a mere ministerial act." 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.
183. E.g., the power to dispose of monetary claims lodged against the govern-
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suant to constitutional authority, it enjoys an immunity to congressional control. 184 This doctrine that the Constitution demarcates a
zone of exclusive executive responsibility can be traced to Marbury
v. Madison 185 and has received contemporary reaffirmation in Myers
v. United States186 and United States v. Nixon. 187
Further support for this doctrine is found in The Federalist
Papers. These writings clearly evince the understanding of the
framers that the Constitution endows the Executive with a certain
autonomy protected from congressional infringement. Madison
recognized that the prophylactic value of the dispersal of powers
within the federal government would be vitiated if one branch could
exert plenary control over another. 188 In the minds of the Federalists, neither the terms of the Constitution itself nor the electoral
process could be relied upon to suppress the animus of one branchespecially the legislature-to infringe upon and usurp the powers of
another. 189 Rather, in order to protect the separation of powers they
looked to "the interior structure of the government" in which "those
ment. See 37 U.S. at 611; State Highway Commn. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1111
(8th Cir. 1973).
184. As stated in Kendall, "The executive power is vested in a President: and
as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of
any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through
the impeaching power." 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610. On the other hand, the Court
also asserted that the contention "that the obligation imposed on the President to
see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a
novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible." 37 U.S. (12 Pet,)
at 613. In this case the President had not attempted to shield the Postmaster General
but, in fact, had left him to his own devices.
185. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[b]y
the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political powers in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and
is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own character." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-66.
186. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In the words of Chief Justice Taft, when the President discharges his "political" executive power, "the discretion to be exercised is
that of the President in determining the national public interest and in directing
the action to be taken by his executive subordinates to protect it." 272 U.S. at
134. See also Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610
(1838): "There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President,"
187. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Although the Court denied the privilege claimed
by the Executive in this case, the Court reiterated that each branch is supreme
"within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privilege
flow from the nature of enumerated powers." 418 U.S. at 705.
188. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison):
[I]t is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the
departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either
of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the
administration of their respective powers.
Id. at 332.
189. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison), No. 49 (J, Madison), No, SO
(J. Madison), No. 51 (J. Madison).
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who administer each department [.are] given the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others."100 Although devices such as the veto power may have been
foremost in the minds of these commentators, their concern for
maintaining truly independent centers of governmental power demands that each branch have autonomous powers to develop policy
within the confines of the respective spheres. Consequently, by conferring the power to execute the laws upon the Executive, the Constitution impliedly bars Congress both from redistributing wholesale
this power to nonexecutive agencies and from denying the Executive
its prerogative to impart its policy choices upon the conduct of the
government's litigation. 191
The framers of the Constitution did not, of course, intend for
mutual suspicions to dominate relations among the departments of
the government; effective government requires cooperative exercise
of complementary powers.192 Much of the ambiguity in the Solicitor
General's position has its source in the faithful execution clause,
which both directs the Executive to administer faithfully legitimate
legislative and judicial decisions and creates a realm in which the
Executive exerts original policy influence. As a result, the Solicitor
General normally pursues ·the interests of a unified government, but
he maintains the freedom, as an agent of the Executive, to make an
independent formulation of governmental policy.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Solicitor General's role has dramatically expanded since the
establishment of the office in 1870. Originally viewed as a mere
assistant to the Attorney General, the Solicitor General now bears
primary responsibility for representing the United States in the Supreme Court, whereas the Attorney General's office has evolved
into an administrative and political position. Along with this enhanced responsibility, the Solicitor General has acquired a sizeable degree of autonomy and a reputation for enlightened representation
of the interests of the United States.
·
190. THE FEDERALIST No. S1, at 347, 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
191. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. S2, 134 (1926). See also United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 93S (1965): "The
executive is charged with caaying out national policy on law-enforcement." 342
F.2d at 193 (Wisdom, J., concurring specially).
192. As Justice Jackson observed in the Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. S79 (1952), "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 343 U.S. at 63S (Jackson, J., concurring).
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The practice of the Solicitor General does not wholly accord with
his image as an advocate beholden only to his understanding of the
law and public policy. Ultimately, he serves the President. Furthermore, insofar as he does exercise independent judgment, his authority
is not easily reconciled with the separation of powers. Yet, the discrepancy between the Solicitor General's perceived role and his actual
conduct is not necessarily troublesome. By and large, the Solicitor
General has properly resolved conflicts among his "public" and institutional responsibilities. Moreover, most of those with an interest
in the Solicitor General's work have respected his authority despite,
or perhaps because of, the ambiguous nature of his role. These developments demonstrate the extent to which historical practice has
conferred legitimacy on certain powers of the Solicitor General that
are not easily derived from any statutory or constitutional rule.
Furthermore, they demonstrate our confidence that informal understandings of the guiding principles of legitimate conduct will prevent
abuse of those powers.

